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In order to con¯ne excessive levels of temporary layo®s, US ¯rms are taxed - albeit incom-
pletely - according to the unemployment insurance bene¯ts claimed by their laid o® workers.
In contrast, German construction ¯rms are not charged according to their layo® history
and should thus have much higher layo® incentives. However, in case of a weather-induced
shortfall of work, a ¯rm's workforce is eligible for a partial subsidy to their employment
costs. The level of this subsidy was subject to several reforms throughout the 1990s which
provides a unique opportunity for examining the empirical link between layo® incentives and
layo® rates. Our analysis is based on large individual administrative data merged with in-
formation about local weather conditions and the business cycle. We observe economically
plausible e®ects: the higher the subsidy to employment costs, the less layo®s occur and the
less weather-dependent is employment.
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Countries with unfavorable conditions for winter construction work tend to experience seasonal
°uctuations in production requirements that create an incentive for ¯rms to temporarily lay o®
workers. According to the seminal paper by Feldstein (1976), such an incentive should be particu-
larly strong if the unemployment insurance (UI) and the tax system lower the costs of temporary
layo®s to ¯rms and workers. In the US, the system of experience rating ensures that ¯rms con-
tribute to the ¯nancing of unemployment bene¯ts by taxing them according to the unemployment
bene¯t receipt of their previous employees. However, this taxing is incomplete so that ¯rms with
high layo® rates experience a cross-subsidy by ¯rms with lower layo® rates. As a result, Feldstein
(1976, 1978) and others (Sa®er 1983; Card and Levine 1994) have shown both theoretically and
empirically that this creates an incentive for excessive layo®s among the subsidized ¯rms, espe-
cially in the construction sector. Moreover, lower layo® costs make recalls less likely and increase
the duration until recall (Jurajda 2004). All of these US studies exploit industry- and state-speci¯c
variation in the experience rating factor in order to analyze the link between between layo® costs
and layo® rates or the duration of unemployment spells. Since in Europe costs produced by the
layo® history of a ¯rm are not internalized via a system of experience rating, such a source of
variation and thus similar studies, to the best of our knowledge, are non-existent. As a related
exception, R¿ed and Nordberg (2003) analyze the e®ect of ¯rms' pay liability during the peri-
ods of temporary layo®s on the length of unemployment in Norway. They show that the length
of unemployment spells until a worker is recalled by an employer is highly sensitive to ¯nancial
incentives for ¯rms.
The aim of this paper is to exploit a source of variation in layo® incentives other than a
system of experience rating in order to provide a ¯rst empirical assessment of the link between
layo® incentives and layo® rates for a European country. In particular, construction ¯rms in
Germany are subject to an instrument that, similar to experience rating, aims at reducing the
¯rm's incentives for temporary layo®s: partial subsidies to employment costs during the winter
period that exempt a ¯rm from paying full wages to its workers in case of a weather-induced
shortfall of work. The aim of this partial subsidy is to reduce layo®s and maintain employment
relationships during periods of weather-induced productivity shocks. The use of this instrument
may thus explain why patterns of seasonal unemployment in Germany are not much stronger than
in the US despite having no system of experience rating (see Figure 1).1 Similarly, recall rates
1Gutierrez-Rieger and Podczeck (1981) and FitzRoy and Hart (1984) suggest that the lack of experience rating
2of unemployed construction workers of about 60% in the US (Katz and Meyer 1991) and up to
50% in Germany (Wilke 2005) also indicate a comparable relevance of temporary layo®s in both
countries.
Figure 1: Monthly unemployment rate in Germany and the US. Note: West-Germany only for









Jan-81 Jan-84 Jan-87 Jan-90 Jan-93 Jan-96 Jan-99 Jan-02
German Unemployment Rate
(in %)
US Unemployment Rate (in %)
For examining the empirical link between layo® incentives and layo® rates in Germany, we
exploit the variation in the level of the subsidy that has been induced by several reforms through-
out the 1990s. For this purpose, we estimate the e®ect of subsidizing weather-induced shortfall
hours on individual layo® probabilities in the construction sector. We do so based on a database
that combines daily individual level administrative panel data of more than twenty consecutive
years with information on the business cycle, local weather conditions at the workplace and in-
formation on institutional changes. Combining all this information is quite unique and helps us
in disentangling the relevance of each of these factors as a determinant of seasonal layo®s. Our
empirical approach thus improves upon earlier studies that either analyze temporary layo®s based
only on individual and ¯rm level information as in Card and Levine (1994) or the e®ect of weather
conditions on aggregate output in the construction sector on a macro level only (Solomou and Wu
1997).
should increase the incidence of temporary layo®s in Europe.
3As another contribution, our study also allows for comparing the e®ectiveness of two of the main
approaches of promoting winter employment in the European construction sector. In particular,
the German construction sector during the 1990s has seen a major shift from a system based on
publicly funding a weather allowance to a system that combines a weather allowance with the use
of overtime accumulation.2 Both of these approaches can be found in a number of northern and
central European countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these approaches has
been analyzed with respect to the e®ectiveness in reducing layo®s. Our analysis thus also provides
a ¯rst microeconometric assessment of the e®ectiveness of employment promotion schemes in
preventing seasonal layo®s in the European construction sector. This may also shed some light on
why the degree of seasonal winter unemployment strongly di®ers across European countries and
is not clearly linked to local climate conditions as suggested by Grady and Kapsalis (2002).
Our results con¯rm a clear link between layo® incentives and individual layo® probabilities in
the German construction sector. In particular, layo® rates decrease with rising subsidies to a ¯rm's
employment costs. Moreover, reduced employment costs due to claiming a weather allowance only
after workers have compensated for an initial shortfall of work by overtime hours results in lower
layo® rates compared to a pure allowance-based scheme. We also ¯nd evidence that layo® rates
increase during periods of weak labor demand and adverse weather conditions, although the e®ects
of weather conditions are less strong than generally thought by the public as most layo®s take place
at ¯xed dates. This implies that the seasonal rise in unemployment in Germany to a large extent
can be explained by planned capacity reductions rather than unfavorable weather conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section describes the main features of the
institutional setup for seasonal employment in Germany. We describe our data in section three
and the econometric framework in section four. The empirical results are presented and discussed
in section ¯ve before we conclude in section six.
2 Institutional setup for seasonal employment in Germany
Following the framework by Bentolila and Bertola (1990), the optimal employment policy of a
¯rm is to lay o® workers if the expected present value of cash °ow, i.e. the expected value of the
di®erence between the marginal revenue product of labor and the employment costs, is lower than
the negative of the ¯ring costs. In this framework, adverse weather conditions can be considered
as a productivity shock that reduce the marginal revenue product of labor and thus increase a
2For an overview of the changes see also Bosch and ZÄ uhlke-Robinet (2003).
4¯rm's incentive to lay o® workers. In order to con¯ne an excessive use of temporary layo®s, the
system of experience rating in the US increases the costs associated with laying o® a worker.
In contrast, the unemployment insurance system in Germany is fully subsidized in the ter-
minology of Feldstein (1976) since there is no element of experience rating and unemployment
bene¯ts are not taxed. Moreover, special regulations in the construction sector generally facili-
tate temporary layo®s compared to other sectors. In particular, employment can be terminated at
short notice.3 Moreover, construction workers are eligible for four (three) month of unemployment
bene¯ts if they have been working at least eight (six) month in a socially insured employment
during the year preceding the bene¯t claim.4 Most seasonal workers are thus able to bridge winter
unemployment by means of unemployment bene¯ts.5
Given this institutional setting one would expect layo® incentives related to adverse weather
conditions to translate into high levels of temporary seasonal unemployment in Germany. How-
ever, employment costs are partially subsidized by the unemployment insurance during periods
of adverse weather conditions, thus increasing the expected present value of the cash °ow associ-
ated with keeping a worker. Apart from a political interest in reducing seasonal unemployment,
lower rates of temporary layo®s are mainly desirable from the perspective of the unemployment
insurance since an unemployment bene¯t claim of a laid o® worker is more costly than paying
the partial subsidy. This subsidy has been subject to a number of reforms during the 1990s. In
what follows we discuss the main characteristics of the di®erent regimes which are also brie°y
summarised in Table 1.
Until 1995, employers could claim a bad weather allowance from the unemployment insurance
fund of the FEA (Federal Employment Agency, Bundesagentur fÄ ur Arbeit) as a compensation for a
weather-induced shortfall of working hours, the so called Schlechtwettergeld (SWG). The allowance
paid workers as if they were entitled to unemployment bene¯ts, i.e. they received around two
thirds of their previous net income while employers only had to pay social insurance contributions
of around four Euro for each hour that was compensated by the bad weather allowance. This
amounts to less than a ¯fth of the usual labor cost and thus provided a substantial subsidy to a
¯rm's employment costs. At the same time, employers were no longer allowed to lay o® workers
3Unlike employment in other sector, employment in the construction sector can be terminated by giving six
(twelve) days' notice if job tenure has been below (above) six month. A one month' notice is necessary if job tenure
exceeds three years.
4These regulation have been modi¯ed after our observation period in 2005.
5For an extensive review of the institutional setup in the German construction industry see ZÄ uhlke-Robinet
(1998) and Bosch and ZÄ uhlke-Robinet (2000, 2003).
5during the statutory winter period from November until March due to adverse weather conditions.
As a reaction to its poor ¯nancial situation in the post-uni¯cation years, the FEA in the season
of 1995/1996 paid a winter allowance, the so called Winterausfallgeld (WAG), equivalent to the
weather allowance from the 151st weather-induced shortfall hour onward only. For the ¯rst 149
shortfall hours, ¯rms had to pay workers 75% of their gross wages of which 20% were reimbursed
by the unemployment insurance fund. While the level of compensation for each shortfall hour
remained roughly unchanged from the perspective of the workers, employers now had to pay
around nine Euro per hour for the ¯rst 149 shortfall hours and four Euro per hour from there
onward. Under this new regime, subsidies to a ¯rm's employment costs thus decreased markedly.
Since unemployment doubled with the introduction of WAG, it was already replaced by a
scheme called overtime WAG (OvWAG) in the season of 1997/1998. While OvWAG again paid
the same weather allowance from the 120th shortfall hour onward, the burden for the ¯rst 119
shortfall hours were now split more equally between employers and workers. In particular, a
minimum of 50 shortfall hours had to be compensated by an accumulation of overtime during
spring and summer and were thus cost-neutral for an employer while workers lost any additional
compensation.6 For the 51st to 119th shortfall hour, ¯rms could either opt for continued overtime
compensation or they could claim a weather allowance of the usual bene¯t level from a fund that
was ¯nanced by a statutory winter levy of 1.7% of a ¯rm's gross wage bill. This fund also ¯nanced
a 50% deduction of an employer's social insurance contributions so that employers only had to pay
reduced social insurance contributions of around two Euro per shortfall hour. Compared to the
previous regime, a ¯rm's employment costs for weather-induced shortfall hours were thus clearly
reduced at the expense of somewhat lower compensation levels on the part of the workers. A
minor modi¯cation of this regime was introduced in the season 1999/2000. The minimum hours
that had to be compensated by overtime accumulation fell to 30 hours and the threshold above
which the FEA again paid the winter allowance fell to 100 shortfall hours, thus again shifting some
of the ¯nancial burden back to the FEA. In addition, the FEA started paying an additional Euro
per hour that was compensated by overtime in order to promote the use of overtime accumulation
beyond the ¯rst threshold. For the following analysis, we mainly focus on the comparison of the
weather allowance system that was in place before 1995 and the use of a winter allowance in
combination with overtime accumulation since the intermediate regime was used only for a short
period of two seasons.
6A worker with overtime would previously receive the overtime pay including a premium and in addition receive
the bad weather allowance. In the new setting, the worker only received the overtime pay including the premium.
6Table 1: Employment promotion schemes between 1981 and 2004
Compensation scheme Employment costs by shortfall hours
SWG - until 1995
² Firm pays social insurance contributions of 4
Euro for each weather-induced shortfall hour
² Workers receive weather allowance corre-
sponding to the level of unemployment ben-
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² 1.-150. shortfall hour:
{ Firm pays workers 75% of their gross
wage, but receives 20% reimbursement
by social insurance fund
{ Workers receive 75% of their gross wage
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OvWAG - since 1997 (modi¯cation since 1999)
² 1-50. (1.-30.) shortfall hour:
{ Workers compensate by overtime and
receive no further compensation
{ Cost neutral for the employer
² 51.-120. (30.-100.) shortfall hour:
{ Workers can but need not compensate
hours by overtime; otherwise, workers
receive allowance equivalent to SWG ¯-
nanced by a statutory winter levy
{ Firms pay 2 Euro for each shortfall hour
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7Since all of the regimes only partially subsidize a ¯rm's employment costs in case of adverse
weather conditions, we ¯rst of all expect layo® incentives in case of a weather-related productivity
shock to be only reduced but not eliminated by these regimes. In spite of the special dismissal
protection that bans layo®s due to adverse weather conditions, layo®s should thus be related to
weather conditions. In fact, this incentive may explain why we observe seasonal unemployment
patterns as shown in Figure 2. As the hypothesis of main interest, we also expect layo® proba-
bilities to vary with the legal setup that a®ects a ¯rm's economic rationale of keeping a worker
temporarily underemployed rather than laying o® the worker. In particular, we expect the inci-
dence of seasonal layo®s to increase c.p. with the cost of continuing employment during shortfall
hours, i.e. from OvWAG to SWG to WAG.7 Moreover, we expect any cushioning e®ect against
weather-induced productivity shocks to weaken the longer the period of adverse weather condi-
tions persists. This is because employers' expectations concerning the future weather conditions
should be based on the available past information on the severity of the winter. Moreover, the
higher the total costs associated with keeping a worker temporarily underemployed for a prolonged
period of adverse weather, the higher the layo® incentive should be. Hence, a cushioning e®ect
against bad weather conditions may be relatively strong for OvWAG.
Figure 2 does not suggest a simple relationship between the individual unemployment risk and
the current regime though. Unemployment risk among construction workers doubled with the
reduced subsidy levels during the winter seasons of 1995/1996 and 1996/1997 compared to the
early 1990s. Yet, unemployment transitions were similarly prevalent during the 1980s. In fact,
the increase in winter unemployment compared to the preceding summer period was particularly
pronounced for two winter seasons: 1987/88 and 1995/96. Moreover, unemployment transitions
remained at a high level under the latest regime. These observed seasonal layo®s likely result from
the combined e®ect of the regulation of the labor market, the severity of weather conditions in
a particular year as well as from business cycle conditions. Moreover, it is cheaper for ¯rms to
lay o® redundant workers than keeping them if the expected length of the redundancy and the
corresponding total costs of continued employment is long enough such that the costs saved from
not laying o® become negligible. For this reason, ¯xed calender times ahead of time intervals that
are considered to be less productive could also increase layo®s. In order to assess the relative
e®ectiveness of the regimes in preventing seasonal unemployment, the empirical analysis thus
7Due to lower compensation levels for the latest regime, workers might have incentives to voluntarily end
employment and leave the sector. Our empirical analysis, however, looks at layo®s only and not at voluntary quits.
For the incidence of layo®s, the ¯rm's economic rationale should be decisive.
8Figure 2: Share of workers in the construction sector that is laid o® during winter and summer
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needs to disentangle the impact of weather conditions, the business environment, the relevance
of certain ¯xed calender times as well as the legal setup. Note that we cannot evaluate the legal
regimes relative to a state without any regulation because our period of analysis is restricted to
1981 until 2004. Moreover, due to the lack of information on the actual receipt of a bad weather
allowance (SWG) or the winter allowance (WAG and OvWAG) on an individual level, we cannot
assess the overall changes in compensation transfers in reaction to the policy reforms.
The construction sector has undergone further changes that need to be kept in mind for the
following empirical analysis. In particular, the previously domestic construction industry has
experienced an increasing transnationalization (Bosch and ZÄ uhlke-Robinet, 2003). While foreign
workers until the early 1990s were employed at the same pay and working conditions than domestic
workers, this territorial principle no longer applies within the EU member states. Foreign workers,
especially from central and eastern European countries, could now be posted from their company
to work in Germany on the terms that apply in their home country. Despite bilateral agreements
on quotas and recommended minimum wages, posted workers in Germany reached an all time high
in 1992 (see Figure 3). The Posted Workers Act in 1996 therefore introduced minimum wages for
all legal workers in Germany including posted workers from abroad, but illegal employment still
provides opportunities for crowding out domestic construction workers. Since data on the amount
9of illegal employment are not available, we cannot evaluate the e®ects of these accompanying
developments. However, we assume that the in°ow of non-domestic workers is not correlated with
the four policy regimes and we control for cyclical patterns by using year dummies. Moreover,
we use individual level indicators for possible e®ects of minimum wages in di®erent parts of the
construction sector which were introduced between 1996 and 1999.
Finally, the identi¯cation of the policy e®ects can also be hampered by improvements in the
production technology in presence of severe weather conditions over time. This could result in a
reduced weather-dependency of layo®s in later years. Since we are not aware of any data about
production technology in the construction sector, we are not able to control for it. In order to
identify changes in response to the policy reforms, we have to assume that such trends are of
minor importance or not correlated with the policy reforms.
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3 Data
Our analysis is based on comprehensive administrative individual data from Germany which is
merged with several regional indicators about the business cycle and weather conditions.
Individual data. We use the IAB employment sample 1975-2004 - regional ¯le (IABS-R04)
which is described in detail by Drews (2008). This administrative data set contains information
10on a 2 % sample of the population working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments. In
particular, we have daily information on employment periods and periods for which the individual
received unemployment compensation from the Federal Employment Agency. Due to data quality
problems in the early years of the data set, we restrict our sample to western Germany between
1981 and 2004. 8 We further restrict our sample to individuals working in the construction sector.
From a descriptive analysis of the daily information it became evident that there are mass
points in the distribution of unemployment in°ows at the end of each month, year and on each
Friday. Moreover, there are major peaks at the last two Fridays before Christmas. Since these
mass points have to be adequately modelled, we transformed the spell information into a weekly
panel starting every Friday. Hence, for each individual, we have a panel of weeks that contains
information on whether an individual is employed or wether there was a transition to unemploy-
ment in a particular week. We assume a transition to unemployment to occur if an individual
receives unemployment compensation within two weeks after the end of the foregoing employment
spell. Since workers in the construction sector are used to the administrative process of claiming
unemployment compensation, workers who receive unemployment compensation with a greater
lag than two weeks are likely to be temporarily suspended from unemployment compensation due
to quitting the job rather than being laid o® by the ¯rm. However, we performed a sensitivity
analysis by using four and twelve weeks as the limiting gap between employment and the receipt
of unemployment and found stable result patterns.
Based on this panel data set, we construct dummies for the weeks that contain the end of a
month, the end of a year and the two pre-Christmas Fridays in order to capture the corresponding
mass points of transitions to unemployment. Moreover, we compute year dummies to capture
aggregate trends and dummies for the statutory winter season between November 1 and March 30.
In addition, we construct bi-weekly dummies for the period November to April to capture potential
seasonal layo® patterns that are independent of weather conditions or the business cycle. On the
individual level, we further compute several work history related variables such as the incidence
and length of previous employment and the incidence of previous recalls or re-employment by
former employers. Moreover, we compute a dummy variable if a worker's occupation suggests a
particularly high dismissal risk during the winter period due to being a blue-collar worker in an
outdoor activity such as a bricklayer.
The resulting sample consists of about 7.1m observations that are produced by 31,000 individ-
8For the period after 1991, estimates both ex- and including the eastern German counties did yield robust
¯ndings.
11uals of which about 10,400 experience at least one transition to unemployment in the observation
period. However, only 0:4% of our observations experience a transition to unemployment since
many individuals are employed for many weeks during the year. Moreover, in an average winter
season, 7:5% of all individuals working in the construction sector become unemployed of which
only 1% experience a transition to unemployment twice. This indicates that individuals tend to
be laid o® once for the whole winter period instead of switching back and forth between em-
ployment and unemployment. Even though this suggests that the e®ect of weather conditions on
the employment status may be limited, it does not preclude that the actual layo® time depends
on current weather conditions or cumulative weather conditions in the current winter season as
discussed in the previous section.
Regional data. Since the IABS-R04 provides county level information about the workplace
location, we can merge regional data about weather conditions and the business cycle. In order
to proxy the business cycle, we include yearly revenues in the construction sector for the sixteen
German states. In order to avoid a scaling problem due to the di®erent sizes of states, we use a
state-speci¯c index of real revenues. Moreover, we merge information on the annual percentage
change of real revenues compared to the previous year to capture a changing business environment
in the construction sector.
The weather data is obtained from the German meteorological service (Deutscher Wetterdienst,
DWD) and comprises information about daily temperature intervals, the amount of snow, rain
and the wind speed for a sample of 35 weather stations throughout Germany.9 These stations
were chosen by the DWD based on the criterium that weather conditions measured at these
stations are representative for the densely populated areas of the surrounding county. Hence,
weather stations that capture local or extreme weather conditions (e.g. hilltops) were excluded.
Moreover, for many counties, the meteorologists at DWD could not identify a weather station
with representative weather conditions for its surrounding county. Owing to these limitations,
our sample of workers in the construction sector is limited to 35 German counties which may not
be fully representative for Germany as a whole. On the other hand, the sample includes a broad
mixture of rural and urban counties spread throughout Germany.
As an alternative to including weather indicators such as temperature or precipitation as
covariates in our analysis, we decided to de¯ne days with severe weather conditions, in short
9The data is available for academic use from the DWD by paying a low administrative fee. We thank the DWD
for its scienti¯c advice and support.
12DSW, that hamper outdoor construction work according to the o±cial DWD de¯nition. We
reconstruct DSW as precise as possible based on the available weather information on temperature
and precipitation. In order to make the data compatible to our weekly panel data, we de¯ne weekly
weather conditions. In particular, we consider a week to have severe weather conditions, in short
WSW, if at least three days ful¯l the DSW criterium. While for the individual data, a weekly
information re°ects the employment status in the week following a Friday, the weather information
merged for this week re°ects weather conditions between the last Monday and the next Sunday,
thus taking account of short-term expectations concerning the weather on the weekend. We tested
alternative speci¯cations but found this one to yield the sharpest estimates. In addition to the
indicator concerning weather conditions in the current week, we also compute the cumulative
number of DSW in a winter season in order to capture the varying severity of the winter that
is likely to a®ect layo®s. Figure 4 reports the smallest and the largest number of DSW in the
sample regions in addition to the overall average during the winter seasons from 1981 until 2003.
The ¯gure thus illustrates that we are able to exploit substantial annual and regional variation
during an interval of more than 20 years.
Figure 4: Number of days with severe weather conditions (DSW) per winter season: min, mean














13Figure 5: Macro developments and institutional regimes.
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Aggregate time series. For the aggregate time series in Figure 5 we ¯nd the expected negative
relationship between revenues and unemployment transitions in the winter (½ = ¡0:6) and the
expected positive relationship between unemployment transitions and the average number of days
with severe weather conditions (½ = 0:4). Note, however, that there is no clear link between the
regime and the unemployment risk in a particular winter. In order to assess the e®ectiveness of the
di®erent regimes in preventing seasonal layo®s, the empirical analysis thus needs to disentangle
the impact of the institutional regime, weather conditions and the business cycle.
14Since we only have time series variation in the institutional setting, our identi¯cation strategy
relies on observing the di®erent regimes under similar business and weather conditions. While
Figure 4 suggests a su±cient variation of weather conditions on the county level across the regimes,
Figure 5 (top) indicates that we observe the SWG regime during both prosperous and declining
business conditions while the subsequent WAG regulations were implemented in rather declining
market environments. Including the less prosperous early 1980s in our analysis is thus important
to observe the di®erent legal regimes under similar business conditions. Moreover, with the state-
level information on the business conditions, we can exploit more variation than suggested by
Figure 5 (top). In fact, Figure 5 (bottom) shows that state-level business conditions observable
for the SWG regime and the OvWAG regime are largely overlapping, while the intermediate WAG
regime is observed only for a narrow range of business cycle conditions. The subsequent analysis
thus mainly focuses on the comparison of the SWG and the OvWAG regime.
4 Econometric Model
As discussed before, layo®s tend to take place only once per winter season with almost no multiple
transitions between the two labour market states. We therefore consider a framework in which
an employed individual i = 1;:::;N can either continue employment or experience a transition
to unemployment at period t = 1;:::;T. Thus, unemployment risk is examined as a binary
outcome with yit = 1 if there is a transition to unemployment and yit = 0 otherwise. Using
this transition indicator, we explore the determinants of experiencing a layo® by modeling the
transition probability as a function of k = 1;:::;K explanatory variables xkit. In particular, we
assume
Pr[yit = 1jxit] = F(¯0 + x
0
it¯)
with F is a monotone function ranging from 0 to 1, ¯0 is an unknown coe±cient, ¯ is a K£1 vector
of unknown coe±cients, and xit is a K £ 1 vector. In most applications and textbooks, F is the
cumulative logistic or normal distribution function and we follow this literature by assuming that
the true function F is logistic. The explanatory variables are a combination of individual, regional
information and calender time dummies. Note that xit does not include a common constant. In
our empirical analysis we estimate the ¯ coe±cients by means of di®erent methods and model
speci¯cations using STATA. In particular, we apply pooled and ¯xed e®ects methods.
15Pooled Model. Pooled estimation of the logit model is mainly attractive because of its conve-
nience. Moreover, it delivers an estimate for the constant ¯0 and for time invariant regressors such
as gender. See Wooldridge (2002) for a detailed review of this approach. Although convenient,
the model has several important disadvantages. For this reason, we do not present full estimation
results in our empirical part. However, since this model provides interesting insights on the e®ects
of time constant individual speci¯c explanatory variables, we brie°y list them in a table in the
Appendix. Our speci¯c model setup faces the additional problem of rare event data (King and
Zheng, 2001) which can lead to a ¯nite sample bias. Rare event data is characterised by a huge
amount of zeros (no transition) and just very few ones (transitions) in the dependent variable.
Even though we have about 7m observations in our pooled sample, we checked these potential
issues by using the STATA code of King and Zheng (relogit). As the corrections resulted in very
minor changes only, we concluded that our sample is indeed not small.
Fixed E®ects Model. The Fixed e®ect (FE) model gains its popularity from the fact that it
produces consistent estimates even in presence of an unobserved individual time constant e®ect
which is allowed to have a non zero population covariance with the observed regressors. The logit
FE panel estimator gains its convenience mainly from its computational convenience as it is a
conditional maximum likelihood estimator. In contrast to the linear FE panel estimator it uses
period data from individuals only, for which the value of the dependent variable switches between
two periods. For the observations generated by these individuals, it is essentially a pooled logit
estimator with period changes of regressors (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, similar to the linear FE
model, it does not yield estimates for time constant variables such as gender and it does not reveal
any information about the individual ¯xed e®ect. In contrast to the linear FE model and pooled
logit model, it is not possible to compute changes in conditional probabilities as the constant and
the ¯xed e®ects are unknown. Given this limitation for interpretation, we also considered a linear
FE model as an alternative speci¯cation. As up to 20% of the ¯tted values of this model do not
fall in the unit interval we decided not to pursue in this direction and results are therefore not
reported. Moreover, we also considered the estimation of a random e®ect panel model but we were
not able to obtain results in a reasonable amount of time. Since our main coe±cients of interest
are time varying (policies, weather, business cycle), we apply the ¯xed e®ect logit estimator and
mainly report results and statistics for this model. Our main empirical ¯ndings are, however,
robust with respect to the choice of the econometric method (pooled logit, linear FE model).
Moreover, as estimated asymptotic standard errors and robust standard errors are very similar in
16our application, we do not report the latter.
We emphasize that our sample is representative for the employment in the construction sector.
If it is not random in the sense that unemployed, inactive and employees in other business sector
di®er systematically from the observations in our sample, our results are not valid for the entire
German population.
Choice of regressors. In our empirical exercise we use di®erent sets of regressors to explore
and determine the e®ect of weather conditions and the legal setup on unemployment risks in the
construction sector. We do not include region dummies and most of the individual level regressors
since the use of ¯xed e®ects requires time varying regressors. However, in Table 5 (Appendix) we
summarize the pooled logit estimates for the individual level covariates. These include a low wage
variable to explore the e®ect of minimum wages in the construction sector which was introduced in
the late 1990s. Moreover, we use age group dummies for older unemployed to capture the e®ects
of di®erent early retirement regulations during the 1980s and 1990s. As some of these variables are
time varying, we also included them in the FE logit model but as the main results were unsensitive
we decided to omit them in the panel analysis.
To analyse the e®ect of the policy changes on unemployment risks we will report results for
three models (A, B and C) which are summarised in Table 2. All models contain year dummies
and several calender time dummies, such as the end of month, end of year, pre-Christmas period
and bi-weekly dummies during the whole winter period. These dummies capture the e®ects due
to the calender time only and help in disentangling the e®ects of severe weather conditions and
calender time. Model A is a simple approach to illustrate the main variation in layo® risks during
the observation period. Estimates for year and winter dummy coe±cients can be related to the
descriptive results in Figure 2, but di®er from the pure descriptive ¯ndings by controlling for a
changing composition among construction workers across time. Model B does not contain winter
dummies. Instead it controls for weather conditions, the changes in the business cycle and allows
for di®erent e®ects of the three policy regimes (SWG, WAG, OvWAG). It is therefore a ¯rst
attempt to disentangle the e®ect of weather conditions and policy regimes while controlling for
the business cycle (real revenue, change in revenue, year dummies). In order to capture both
short-term and long-term e®ects of the local weather conditions, model B includes both a dummy
variable on whether the current week had severe weather conditions as well as four dummy variables
for the number of DSW during the current winter season. Model C contains interactions between
weather conditions and policy regimes to allow for heterogeneous treatment patterns depending
17on the regime, the current weather conditions and the cumulative bad weather period during a
season.
Table 2: Regressor sets in models A B and C.
variable description in model
end year, end month, pre Xmas,
bi-weekly dummies during win-
ter, year dummies
calender time dummies A B C
season81 - season04 winter season dummies A
SWG, WAG, OvWAG dummies for the policy regime in the statutory winter
period
B C
revenue revenue in the construction sector (index, state level) B C
change revenue annual % change in revenue, winter period only (state
level)
B C
WSW ¸ 3 days with severe weather conditions in current
winter week (dummy, county level)
B C
WSWw1 - WSWw4 WSW in current week and total number of DSW dur-
ing the current winter period amounts to 1, 2, 3 or ¸4
weeks (dummies, county level)
B
SWG, WAG, OvWAG X
WSWw1 - WSWw4
WSWw1 - WSWw4 interacted with each policy regime
SWG, WAG and OvWAG
C
All indicators are dummy variables except for revenue and change revenue.
DSW: days with severe weather conditions; WSW: weeks with severe weather conditions
5 Empirical Results
Table 3 shows estimates for the three speci¯cations of the ¯xed e®ects logit model as described in
the previous section. Year and winter season dummies are not reported to ease the reading of the
table. Instead, Figure 6 shows the corresponding odds ratios for model A which resemble the purely
descriptive evidence from Figure 2 in many but not all respects. In particular, unemployment
risks during the summer period have been constantly increasing since the early 1980s according
to Figure 6. Moreover, unemployment risks during the winter period have always exceeded those
18during the summer, but the di®erence temporarily vanishes during the boom period after German
reuni¯cation. The largest increase of unemployment transitions compared to the summer level
can be found during the mid 1980s, mid 1990s and the last three years, thus spanning all major
policy regimes. Without taking account of weather and business cycle conditions, there is thus no
clear prediction as to the e®ectiveness of the policy regimes in reducing layo®s. Note that we do
not report year dummy estimates for models B and C because year dummy coe±cients are similar
across the three speci¯cations and have already been shown in Figure 6.
Table 3: Estimated odds ratios for unemployment ob-
tained by ¯xed-e®ects logistic regression model.
Model A Model B Model C
Calender time
End month 2.535*** 2.516*** 2.524***
End year 4.563*** 4.998*** 4.969***
Pre Xmas 1.432*** 1.352*** 1.344***
Weeks 45-46 1.171*** 1.385*** 1.394***
Weeks 47-48 1.544*** 1.771*** 1.786***
Weeks 49-50 2.524*** 2.757*** 2.796***
Weeks 51-52 2.073*** 2.251*** 2.287***
Weeks 53+ 3.864*** 3.959*** 3.979***
Weeks 1-2 3.268*** 3.092*** 3.170***
Weeks 3-4 2.193*** 2.056*** 2.094***
Weeks 5-6 1.736*** 1.607*** 1.642***
Weeks 7-8 1.803*** 1.620*** 1.648***
Weeks 8-9 1.239*** 1.228*** 1.243***
Weeks 10-11 0.829*** 0.864** 0.873*
Business cycle
Revenue 0.291*** 0.288***
Change revenue 3.263*** 3.330***
Bad weather
Continued on next page
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Interaction of policy regime and bad weather
SWG £ WSW 0.919
WAG £ WSW 0.555
















Number of obs = 2,750,395
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Model A Model B Model C
Number of groups = 10,426
Obs per group: min = 2, avg = 263.8, max = 1,251
Log Likelihood -74,850 -74,887 -74,890
Signi¯cance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
Note: results for year dummies not reported (all models)
results for season dummies shown in Figure 6 (model A)
Model A also suggests another interesting ¯nding. The odds of experiencing a transition to
unemployment is much higher at ¯xed calender times such as the end of a month or week as
well as the one to two weeks prior to Christmas. We also ¯nd a strong bi-weekly pattern of
unemployment in°ows during the winter period. Of course these patterns could to some extent
re°ect the e®ects of weather conditions, which are not accounted for in model A. However, theses
strong result patterns with regard to these ¯xed calender times remain robust when including
the relevant indicators (as done in models B and C). Therefore, consistent with our hypothesis in
section 2, we ¯nd strong evidence for layo®s being strongly determined by ¯xed calender times.
In the public debate, weather conditions have been considered as a major determinant of
seasonal unemployment. In fact, adverse weather conditions are the prime justi¯cation for the peak
in the unemployment rate during the winter period as shown in Figure 1 and the introduction of
all-season employment promotion measures. Model B is therefore a ¯rst attempt to disentangle the
impact of weather conditions, the business cycle and the legal setup by simultaneously controlling
for all these factors.
The estimation results for model B suggest that adverse weather conditions signi¯cantly in-
crease unemployment risks only if there have been more than two weeks of such conditions in the
current winter season. Moreover, the odds of experiencing a transition to unemployment further
increases with an extended period of four or more weeks of adverse weather conditions. Neverthe-
less, the impact of weather conditions appears minor compared to most calender times, a ¯nding
that is robust with respect to other model speci¯cations which we do not present. However, this
may partly re°ect that the employment promotion during the statutory winter period has to some
extent already made the construction sector weather-proof (e.g. stronger dismissal protection in
21Figure 6: Estimated odds ratio of experiencing a transition to unemployment (Model A). Reference
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presence of bad weather). The impact of weather conditions might have been stronger in absence
of employment promotion measures prior to our observation period. As an additional explana-
tion, the impact of weather conditions may have been partly exaggerated and confused with other
factors such as empty order books. In fact, unemployment risks strongly decline with increasing
revenue levels in the construction sector (keeping the percentage change constant). Moreover, the
partial e®ect of an annual percentage change in revenues is not signi¯cant during the summer (and
has therefore not been included in the model) while it is signi¯cantly positive during the winter.
In years of increasing revenues (given the same revenue level), ¯rms thus seem to hire additional
workers that do not belong to the core personnel and that are laid o® in the subsequent winter
period. Thus, we do ¯nd a strong and plausible impact of the business cycle on the in°ow into
unemployment.
In reference to the summer period, unemployment risks are signi¯cantly higher during the
statutory winter period as captured by the three regimes of employment promotion in model B.
Note that we do not observe a time period prior to the introduction of employment promotion
regimes so that we can only compare the relative e®ectiveness of the four regimes in reducing indi-
22vidual layo®s. In particular, compared to SWG and WAG unemployment risks appear lower during
winter periods in which a °exible working time approach has been implemented (OvWAG). Fur-
thermore, di®erences between SWG and OvWAG are highly signi¯cant, indicating that OvWAG
has been more e®ective in cushioning the impact of adverse work conditions during the winter
period. This ranking of employment promotion regimes is in line with the hypothesis in section 2.
As a major limitation, model B does not yield any insights on the e®ect of the employment
regimes depending on weather conditions. According to the discussion in section 2, the cushioning
e®ect of certain regimes may wear o® at a varying speed with accumulating adverse weather
conditions during a winter season. In particular, the cushioning e®ect should wear o® faster, the
faster a ¯rm's total cost of maintaining an employment relationship increase with accumulating
shortfall hours due to adverse weather conditions. Model C thus extends the previous speci¯cation
by interacting the four legal regimes with weather conditions in the current week and cumulative
weather conditions in the present season. Findings for the other covariates are mainly una®ected
by this extension so that we concentrate on the interpretation of these interaction e®ects. Table 4
eases this interpretation by not only showing the odds ratio of the SWG regime and its interactions
with weather conditions, but by also displaying the corresponding di®erences to the two alternative
regimes and their signi¯cance levels.
Table 4: Comparison of estimated odds ratios (OR) for the SWG regime with the two
WAG regimes of employment promotion by weather conditions.
OR of OR of SWG minus OR of ...
SWG WAG OvWAG
Base e®ect of policy regime 1:60 ¡0:17 0:19***
Base e®ect ^ WSW 1:76 0:59 0:02
Base e®ect ^ WSW ^ WSWw1 1:79 ¡0:18 0:14
Base e®ect ^ WSW ^ WSWw2 2:20 ¡0:05 0:38**
Base e®ect ^ WSW ^ WSWw3 2:21 0:22 0:52**
Base e®ect ^ WSW ^ WSWw4 2:58 0:07 0:34**
Note: Based on the results for model C in Table 3.
Signi¯cance levels: ***: 1% **: 5% *: 10%
First of all note that the odds of experiencing a transition to unemployment rises under the
SWG regime from a base level of 1:6 to about 1:8 if bad weather conditions obstruct outside work
23in the current week and to about 2:6 if there have been at least four weeks of adverse weather
conditions in the present season compared to a summer week with normal weather conditions.
Thus, as hypothesised, the cushioning e®ect of employment promotion wears o® with accumulating
bad weather days.
When compared to the WAG regime that increases the ¯nancial burden for the employer, we do
not ¯nd any systematic di®erences between the SWG and the WAG regime. As mentioned earlier
WAG estimates may have a lack of reliability which precludes us from ¯nding clearer results.
However, in accordance with our hypotheses in section 2, the OvWAG regime reduces the risk
of unemployment compared to the SWG regime. In particular, di®erences between OvWAG and
SWG strongly increase with a prolonged period of adverse weather conditions. If adverse weather
conditions prevail for at least two weeks in a present winter season, the odds ratio under the
OvWAG regime is signi¯cantly lower by around 0:4. Our estimates have a causal interpretation if
there are no relevant trends other than the business cycle which a®ect the probability of lay-o®.
For this reason, we have also estimated a model with a linear time trend to proxy for technological
change. While this trend had a signi¯cantly positive e®ect, our main results remained unchanged.
Although it is di±cult to verify that trends are not correlated with the policy regime periods
under investigation, we do not ¯nd evidence that our results are seriously biased.
Our estimation results therefore suggest that the °exibilization of working hours by means of
overtime accumulation and the corresponding reduction of the ¯scal burden a shortfall of work
means to employers has been e®ective in reducing weather-induced seasonal layo®s compared to
the long-standing SWG regime. In fact, our results indicate that seasonal unemployment has
become less dependent on weather conditions under the most favorable regime OvWAG. Layo®
probabilities less strongly increase with very prolonged periods of adverse weather conditions as
suggested by the corresponding interaction e®ects in Table 3. The construction sector under the
OvWAG regime has thus turned increasingly weather-proof. The peak in seasonal unemployment
during the last observed years can thus not be attributed to a failure of the legal regime, but
seems to be dominated by macro developments with regard to the declining business environment
and a possible crowding out of domestic workers by mainly illegal foreign workers. Most of the
increase in unemployment transitions thus seems captured by the year dummies for 2002 to 2004
that are much higher than in the previous years (see Figure 6).
Furthermore, note that even under the most e®ective regime OvWAG, the odds of experiencing
a layo® during the winter period is signi¯cantly higher than during the summer period (base e®ect
of 1.6). This suggests that a substantial share of seasonal layo®s is unrelated to either weather
24conditions or the business cycle. One explanation for this ¯nding could be that employers prefer to
permanently layo® workers (e.g. due to retirement) during the winter period as another adjustment
mechanism to the seasonal character of construction work. This could also explain the mass
points of layo®s at ¯xed calender times during the winter period and would indicate that a certain
level of seasonal unemployment is unlikely to disappear even with the most e®ective employment
promotion measure. We created a variable indicating a very hard winter by comparing cumulative
bad weather days to the average number over the whole observation period. Surprisingly we found
that unemployment risks are not systematically higher during extremely adverse winter periods.
This is further evidence for a planned capacity reduction by ¯rms. We also estimated a model
where we interacted ¯xed calender times with the regimes. As several weather and regime related
coe±cients in this model loose signi¯cance, we concluded that such a speci¯cation is too °exible
so that we do not report results here.
We ¯nish this section by brie°y summarising the main ¯ndings for the individual level variables
from the pooled estimation (see Table 5, Appendix). Since all variables are dummy variables, it is
possible to relate them directly. Having had a previous unemployment period strongly increases
the incidence of unemployment. In addition, having already had a recall in the past weakens the
e®ect in the summer while it strongly increases the e®ect during the winter. Interestingly, there
is some evidence for discrimination against foreign nationals. Information on the citizenship is
sometimes missing in the data even after imputing previous or future values from the individ-
ual employment biographies. For this reason we create a dummy for unknown citizenship. The
coe±cient on this variable is highly positive but more research on data quality is necessary to un-
derstand the composition of this group (German/non German). We observe a signi¯cant increase
in unemployment risk for older employees with longer entitlement lengths for unemployment ben-
e¯ts after the late 1980s. We do not obtain evidence that the 1997 reform of the unemployment
bene¯t system was able to o®set these developments. Unemployment risk decreases if tenure is
more than one year and strongly increases if the worker's wage is in the lowest quintile of the pop-
ulation wage distribution. The situation for low wage workers became even worse during the late
1990s. With the introduction of the Posted Worker Act, the German government has introduced
minimum wages in several sub sectors of the construction sector such as electrical installation,
roo¯ng etc. Since the minimum wage regulations treat only parts of the workforce during speci¯c
periods of time, they can be analysed with a di®erence in di®erences setup (see also KÄ onig and
MÄ oller, 2008). Unfortunately, we only have access to highly aggregated business sector level in-
formation and therefore cannot distinguish between the relevant business sub sector on ¯rm level.
25However, we interacted the sub sector minimum wage regulation periods by the profession of the
workers (roofer, painter,...) to proxy for the speci¯c business sub sectors. Our resulting di®erence
in di®erences estimates are mainly insigni¯cant. Therefore, similar to KÄ onig and MÄ oller (2008)
we do not obtain empirical evidence for strong e®ects of the introduction of minimum wages on
employment stability. The increase in unemployment risks for low paid workers therefore has to
be explained by other reasons such as a shift of low paid employment subject to social security
contributions towards other forms of employment. However, more detailed analysis using less
aggregated data would be required to analyse this question in greater detail.
6 Conclusion
Given the general lack of experience rating components in their unemployment insurance systems,
a number of European countries have adopted di®erent forms of employment subsidies to avoid
temporary layo®s in the construction sector. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has
been no attempt to assess the e®ectiveness of such measures in preventing seasonal layo®s so
far. In Germany, recent years have seen several reforms that shifted the ¯nancial burden of a
seasonal labor slack back and forth between employers, workers and the unemployment insurance
fund. In particular, there has been a major shift from a system based on publicly funding a
weather allowance to a system that promotes the additional use of overtime hours. For two of
the main approaches of promoting all-season employment in the European construction sector,
the regime shifts in Germany thus constitute a prime opportunity for comparing the e®ectiveness
of such measures in preventing seasonal layo®s. Based on an extensive daily panel of individual
employment histories, this paper examined the impact of the changing legal setup on individual
layo® probabilities conditional on information concerning the regional business cycle as well as
local weather conditions. Our analysis thus disentangled the main determinants of a seasonal
layo® which, due to a lack of profound microeconometric research, have often been confused in
the public debate.
Our results con¯rm the general belief that unemployment risks are lower in case of a favorable
business environment. However, layo® risks are higher during winters that follow a boom year,
thus indicating the previous hiring of additional workers that do not belong to the core personnel.
Our results also suggest, that the impact of weather conditions is signi¯cant, but less strong than
usually thought as layo®s mainly take place at ¯xed calendar times. Our results therefore suggest
that seasonal unemployment is systematically linked to planned capacity reduction during less
26productive time periods.
As expected, the higher the subsidies to a ¯rm's employment costs in case of a weather-
induced shortfall of work, the higher is the layo® probability. In particular, the longstanding bad
weather allowance (SWG) is associated with more layo®s compared to the winter allowance with
°exible working hours accounts (OvWAG). Moreover, OvWAG appears to make the construction
sector largely weather-proof. At the same time, the ¯scal burden on the part of the Federal
Employment Agency of promoting all-season employment has been considerably lower under the
OvWAG than under the SWG regime as annual real expenses fell from about EUR 500m to about
EUR 250m. The combination of compensating initial shortfall hours by overtime hours with a
weather allowance that is paid only after the shortfall of working hours exceeds some threshold
thus results in more stable employment relationships at lower public expenditures.
However, since workers are ¯nancially worse o® when compensating shortfall hours by overtime
accumulation, high ability workers may not be willing to accept these cutbacks in exchange for
stable employment and may thus leave the construction sector permanently. This concern was
among the reasons why OvWAG was abolished in 2006 and replaced by the Saisonkurzarbeit-
ergeld, a legal setup that is more generous in publicly compensating for shortfall hours than the
long-standing weather allowance, but that tries to promote the use of °exible working hours by
additional economic incentives. Since we do not have access to post 2006 data, we are not able to
evaluate the most recent reform. This is left to future research as well as an attempt to evaluate the
cost e±ciency of public employment subsidies. For this purpose, it would be necessary to observe
a winter period without any employment subsidy. While our ¯ndings indicate that employment
subsidies a®ect layo® probabilities and may thus partially explain why seasonal unemployment in
Germany is no more pronounced than in the US despite having no system of experience rating, the
available data in Germany do not allow to tell to what extent employment subsidies prevent layo®s
relative to a winter without any such subsidy. Given this open question, it would be interesting
to perform a similar analysis for countries with equivalent policy schemes if there are periods or
regions in absence of any employment promotion.
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Table 5: E®ect of individual level variables on unemployment risks in the west German construction
sector. Symbolic results derived from pooled logistic regression with 7,089,948 observations.
variable name e®ect variable name e®ect
female - aged <26 +
aged 51-55 0 aged >55 -
aged 51-55 & >24 months employment - aged >55 & >24 months employment -
ext UIB entitlements for aged 51-55 in
1987-1997
0 ext UIB entitlements for aged >55 in
1987-1997
+
ext UIB entitlements for aged 51-55 af-
ter 1997
+ ext UIB entitlements for aged >55 after
1997
+
previous unemployment ++ previous unemployment and winter 0
same employer before previous unem-
ployment
{ same employer before previous unem-
ployment and winter
++
foreign citizen + unknown citizenship ++
blue collar + blue collar and winter +
previous employment 6-12 months 0 previous employment >12 months {
low wage ++ low wage after 1997 +
construction worker after 1997 + roofer after 1997 0
electrician after 1997 - painter after 2003 +
min wage construction 0 min wage roofer 0
min wage electrician 0 min wage painter -
Legend: ++ strong positive e®ect, + positive e®ect, 0 negligible e®ect, - negative e®ect, ¡¡ strong
negative e®ect
30